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BANKRUPTCY 28 U.S.C. SECTION
158(d): A CASE OF LAPSUS
CALA MI
Judy Beckner Sloan *
The United States Courts of Appeals are courts of limited jurisdiction
which generally follow specific statutory provisions.1 In the area of bank-
ruptcy, however, the provisions are incomplete and confusing.
Although the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19782 (1978 Act) clarified the
bankruptcy laws of the United States, the United States Supreme Court later
found the fundamental structure of the bankruptcy courts unconstitutional
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.3 Congress
corrected the structural infirmities in 1984, 4 but failed to eliminate a prob-
lem Marathon created in the jurisdictional scheme of the appellate courts
under the 1978 Act. Consequently, the courts have struggled with the appel-
late jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals of bankruptcy matters available
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).5
* Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A. 1967, University of Chicago;
J.D. 1975, University of Maryland. Special thanks to Martin J. Miller, a third year law student
at the University of Toledo, for his invaluable aid as my research assistant on this project. I
am also grateful for the help of my colleague, Dean Lawrence Ponoroff, for his suggestions and
encouragement and Malcolm M. Gaynor of Schwartz, Cooper, Kalb & Gaynor, Chicago, Illi-
nois, for his guidance on bankruptcy appeals.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49 (1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101, 98 Stat. 333, 333 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988)).
3. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
4. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see text accompanying notes 75, 77-100.
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The Supreme Court's recent handling of Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v.
Ben Cooper, Inc.6 has amplified the exigency of this question. In Ben
Cooper, the Court granted certiorari on June 28, 1990' and had scheduled
the case for oral argument on December 3, 1990, to determine, among other
things, the question of jury trials in the bankruptcy courts. The United
States, however, intervened and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals.' The Supreme Court, agreeing that a jurisdictional problem ex-
isted, vacated and remanded the case to the Second Circuit "for considera-
tion of the jurisdictional issue raised by the United States." 9
There appears to be no answer regarding the jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals that will fit into the present statutory framework, and circuit courts
have even resorted to the extraordinary writ of mandamus as a means of
resolving the problem. Because the circuits are split in this critical area, 1
this Article proposes a statutory solution that permits courts of appeals com-
6. 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990).
7. 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990).
8. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (discussing the interlocutory nature of
this appeal).
9. Ben Cooper, 111 S. Ct. at 425. The opinion of the Court reads, in its entirety:
The United States, whose motion to intervene filed in this Court on September 28,
1990 was granted, has raised a question concerning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction
over this case and hence a question about our own jurisdiction. Because the Court of
Appeals should address the jurisdictional issue in the first instance, we vacate the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and remand
the case for consideration of the jurisdictional issue raised by the United States.
Id. (citation omitted).
On January 22, 1991, the Second Circuit held that it did indeed have jurisdiction and rein-
stated its previous judgment. In re Ben Cooper, 924 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1991); see infra text
accompanying note 138. The petitioner, Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, has filed a peti-
tion for certiorari. The Supreme Court, however, recently denied the Solicitor General's re-
quest for expedition of the petition. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Ben Cooper, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 1100 (1991). Thus, it appears the Court is in no hurry to decide the merits of the case.
10. See, e.g., Capitol Credit Plan, Inc. v. Shafer, 912 F.2d 749, 751 (4th Cir. 1990) (no
interlocutory appeal allowed because section 158(d) exclusively governs appellate jurisidiction
of case originating in bankruptcy court); In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380, 386 (10th Cir.
1990) (same); In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d 727, 735 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); In re Apex Oil
Co., 884 F.2d 343, 346-47 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); In re Chateaugay Corp., 880 F.2d 1509,
1511 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); In re Brown, 803 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); In re TCL
Investors, 775 F.2d 1516, 1517 (11 th Cir. 1985) (same); In re American Colonial Broadcasting
Corp., 758 F.2d 794, 800 (1st Cir. 1985) (same); cf In re Benny, 791 F.2d 712, 716-18 (9th Cir.
1986) (no jurisdiction for court of appeals to hear interlocutory appeal; however, both sections
158(d) and 1291 are alternate sources of jurisdiction); In re Salem Mortgage Co., 783 F.2d 626,
632 (6th Cir. 1986) (same). But see In re Jartran, Inc., 886 F.2d 859, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1989)
(section 1292(b) allows interlocutory appeal to court of appeals from bankruptcy court).
There were 594,567 bankruptcy filings in the United States in 1988. 1988 DIRECTOR ADMIN.
OFF. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. at Table F-1.
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plete appellate jurisdiction, including interlocutory appeals, in bankruptcy
cases and proceedings.
This Article summarizes the general jurisdiction of the courts of appeals.
Then, this Article considers the changes made by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 along with the available legislative history. Next, this Article
outlines the present statutory construction of the Bankruptcy Amendments
of 1984, which can be considered a "slip of the pen" or lapsus calamL Fi-
nally, this Article proposes a workable solution by concluding that Congress
should amend the relevant statutory provisions to allow for complete appel-
late jurisdiction.
I. GENERAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS
A. The "Final Order" Rule
As a general rule, appellate courts may only hear appeals from "final deci-
sions" of the lower courts.11 Courts often interpret this "final order" rule to
mean that an order is appealable only if it "ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." 1 2 This
rule prevents the piecemeal litigation that would occur under a less stringent
standard. 1
3
Although the final order rule can at times produce discomfiting results, in
the majority of cases the rule's benefits far outweigh its shortcomings. The
rule helps to prevent parties from facing bankruptcy brought on by constant
11. Appeals of federal cases are a statutory right provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 which
states, in part:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the. district
courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Is-
lands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
12. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
13. See, e.g., Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940), where the Court
stated:
Since the right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a
necessary ingredient of justice, Congress from the very beginning has, by forbidding
piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy,
set itself against enfeebling judicial administration. Thereby is avoided the obstruc-
tion to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a
succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give
rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment. To be effective, judicial administration
must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by permitting separate
reviews of the component elements in a unified cause.
1991]
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premature appeals by wealthier adversaries.' 4 In addition, many appeals
from nonfinal orders may turn out to be unnecessary because appellants win
favorable final judgments from trial courts. 5 In the end, the final order rule
ensures the economical and efficient operation of the appellate process.
B. Exceptions to the "Final Order" Rule
1. Interlocutory Decisions
The primary statutory exception to the final order rule is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292.16 Subsection (a) of this statute permits appeals of specific types of
interlocutory orders: those "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions,"' 7 those
"appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships,"'" and
those "determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty
cases."'
19
Subsection (b) of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 permits discretionary appeals of inter-
locutory orders when both the district court and the court of appeals agree
that such an appeal is appropriate.2° To be suitable for appeal under this
14. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3907, at 432 (1976).
15. Id. at 431.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . . or of the judges
thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,
or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court;
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind
up receiverships... ;
(3) Interlocutory decrees... determining the rights and liabilities of the
parties to admiralty cases ....
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise ap-
pealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a control-
ling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals ... may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order ... : Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not
stay proceedings in the district court unless the district court judge or the Court of
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988).
17. Id. § 1292(a)(1).
18. Id. § 1292(a)(2).
19. Id. § 1292(a)(3).
20. Id. § 1292(b).
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subsection, the interlocutory order in question must "involve[] a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation."21
Both the specific exceptions of section 1292(a), as well as the provision for
discretionary appeals under section 1292(b), recognize the need for flexibility
in determining which orders are appealable. By permitting narrow excep-
tions to the finality requirement, the final order rule becomes less severe.22
2. The All Writs Statute
The All Writs Statute provides the other statutory exceptions to the final
order rule, the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition.23 While a
writ of mandamus commands the trial court to act and the writ of prohibi-
tion forces the trial court to cease acting, appellate courts can use both to
review trial court orders that are otherwise not appealable. When appellate
courts use the writs in this way, they are essentially equivalent remedies.24
As their names imply, the use of these writs is a drastic measure, and
should "be invoked only in extraordinary situations. ' ,25 The United States
Supreme Court, in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., reiterated that in
order for a writ to be granted, the aggrieved party must show that he has
"no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires."'26 In the majority
of cases, federal courts use the writs "to confine an inferior court to a lawful
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority
when it is its duty to do so."27 Because of these strict limitations, federal
courts rarely issue the writs of prohibition and mandamus. That circuit
courts use them more frequently to dispose of bankruptcy appeals indicates
that the statutory scheme is defective.
28
21. Id.
22. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3920, at 6 (1977).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988). "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id.
24. Ex Parte Simons, 247 U.S. 231, 239 (1918).
25. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980).
26. Id. at 35.
27. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
28. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text (discussing cases that use the writ of
mandamus).
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3. The Collateral Order Doctrine
The collateral order doctrine also offers a narrow exception to the final
order rule. Appellate courts use it occasionally to permit appeals of orders
that are not final in the traditional sense. The Supreme Court first stated the
doctrine in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation 29 and recently
reinforced its validity in Gulfstream v. Mayacamus Corporation."3 In Gulf-
stream, the Court outlined a three-pronged test to determine when an order
falls within the limited scope of the collateral order doctrine. "First, the
order must 'conclusively determine the disputed question.' Second, the order
must 'resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action.' Third and finally, the order must be 'effectively unreviewable on ap-
peal from a final judgment.' ,31
For an order to be appealable under the doctrine, it must meet each of
these requirements.32 Although judges have criticized the collateral order
exception, 3 it remains a viable deviation from the finality requirement.
29. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
30. 485 U.S. 271 (1988).
The Court, however, did overrule the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, which courts had used in
the past as a judicial expansion of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Under this doctrine, federal courts
considered orders that stayed or denied the stay of injunctions involving "a historically legal
action on the basis of a historically equitable defense or counterclaim;" therefore, because the
federal courts considered these orders, they were appealable under § 1292(a)(1). Gulfstream,
485 U.S. at 281. The Court held that the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine was "unsound in theory,
unworkable and arbitrary in practice, and unnecessary to achieve any legitimate goals." Id. at
283.
For further criticism of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, see Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1986), where Judge Posner stated:
Experience since the cases establishing the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine were decided,
coupled with later decisions by the Supreme Court concerning related issues of ap-
pealability, and a statutory change in the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals-all
occurring against a background of extraordinarily rapid growth in the workload of
those courts-have made clear that the doctrine is arbitrary, mischievous, and devoid
of contemporary utility.
Id.
31. Gulfstream, 485 U.S. at 276 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978)).
32. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11-
13 (1983)).
33. See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986), where Judge
Posner criticized the three-pronged test of the doctrine.
Although the test first stated in Cohen remains canonical, as with so many multi-
'pronged' legal tests it manages to be at once redundant, incomplete, and unclear.
The second 'prong' is part of the third. If the order sought to be appealed is not
definitive, an immediate appeal is not necessary to ward off harm; there is no harm
yet. The first 'prong' seems unduly rigid; if an order unless appealed really will harm
the appellant irreparably, should the fact that it involves an issue not completely
separate from the merits of the proceeding always prevent an immediate appeal?
[Vol. 40:265
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF APPEALS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978
Prior to 1978, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898"4 regulated much of the field of
bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19783" (1978 Act) com-
pletely revised the old bankruptcy laws,36 which "had been rendered obso-
lete by social, legal, and economic permutation."3 The product of nearly
ten years' work, the 1978 Act changed both the substantive and procedural
laws of bankruptcy. The Act's legislative history contains thousands of
pages covering the role of the bankruptcy courts and personal bankruptcy
matters.3 8 Few pages, however, address appeals under the 1978 Act.39
The legislative history of the 1978 Act began in July 1970, with the forma-
tion of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.' The
commission submitted a report to Congress in July 1973, and its proposed
Bankruptcy Act was introduced as a bill in both the House4 ' and the Sen-
ate.42 A competing bill proposed by the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges was also introduced in the House.43 After numerous subcommittee
hearings and several amendments by both the House and the Senate, the two
groups and members of Congress compromised on their positions.'
The compromise, which many prominent constitutional authorities, in-
cluding Chief Justice Warren Burger, opposed, concerned the elevation of
Id. (emphasis in original).
34. Pub. L. No. 62-57, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The only major revision of the Bankruptcy Act was the Chandler
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-575, 52 Stat. 840.
35. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101, 98 Stat. 333, 333 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988)).
36. For an overview of the major changes that Congress made through the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, see Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-
for-Lawyers Bill, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1979).
37. Eisen & Smrtnik, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-An Elevated Judiciary, 28 DE
PAUL L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1979).
38. Aaron, supra note 36, at 22.
39. See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text (discussing the appellate process under
the 1978 Act).
40. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
41. H.R. 10,792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
42. S. 4026, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
43. H.R. 16,642, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The proposal of the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges was not introduced in the Senate until the 94th Congress was in session.
See S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
44. As one commentator has noted, however, many of the provisions in the Act appear to
have come from the National Bankruptcy Conference, a private nonprofit organization.
Aaron, supra note 36, at 2.
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the status of the bankruptcy courts.45 The final version of the Act removed
many administrative functions from the workload of the bankruptcy
judges." It also established independent bankruptcy courts as adjuncts of
the district courts, without granting bankruptcy judges the status of Article
III judges.47
With this change in the structure of the bankruptcy courts, Congress en-
acted changes in the appellate procedures for bankruptcy proceedings.
Under the old Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy judges acted as referees and
all of their decisions were reviewable by district courts.48 Many believed
that this structure undermined the independence of the bankruptcy judges.
Thus, the House proposed that all appeals from the new bankruptcy judges
go directly to the courts of appeals.49 The Senate opted for the Bankruptcy
Commission's proposal, which would continue the practice of appealing
bankruptcy cases to the district courts.50 As a compromise, Congress cre-
ated three separate avenues of appeal.
First, under the 1978 Act, Congress gave district courts jurisdiction over
"appeals from all final judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy
courts." 51 The statute also gave district courts jurisdiction over "appeals
from interlocutory orders and decrees of bankruptcy courts, but only by
leave of the district court.",
52
Bankruptcy appellate panels would have provided another route of ap-
peal."a Before Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 160, the circuit council for
each circuit could have created such appellate panels.54 Each panel would
45. See Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 941,
954 (1979).
46. The opposition eventually proved to be correct, however, and this structure was found
to be unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50 (1982). For the current structure of the bankruptcy courts, see infra notes 65-75 and ac-
companying text.
47. Article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
48. Pub. L. No. 62-57, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
49. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1786 (1978).
50. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 33,991 (1978).
51. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1334(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668.
52. Id. § 1334(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668.
53. For a recent discussion of the history of the development and use of these appellate
panels, see Bermant & Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience, 21
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181 (1989).
54. The statute provided in pertinent part:
[Vol. 40:265
Interlocutory Appeals In Bankruptcy
have been comprised of three judges and could have heard appeals under the
same standards as those of the district courts."5
The final avenue of appeal from the bankruptcy courts was directly to the
courts of appeals. 56 Title 28, section 1293(b) provided for appeals "from a
final judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy court" if both parties agreed
to such an appeal.5 Section 1293 also provided for appeals to the courts of
appeals from "all final decisions" of bankruptcy appellate panels,5" and for
appeals from a "final judgment, order, or decree" of an appellate panel or a
district court.5 9
A complete review of the legislative history of the 1978 Act reveals little
concerning the appellate role of the courts in bankruptcy matters. Signifi-
cantly, the original draft of section 1293 contained only the provisions re-
garding appeals from "final decisions" of appellate panels and the "consent"
jurisdiction over direct appeals from the bankruptcy courts to the courts of
appeals." Under the 1978 Act, however, parties could still use 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 to appeal final decisions of the district courts hearing appeals from
bankruptcy courts. Congress added the additional language of section
1293(b), pertaining to appeals from a "final judgment, order, or decree of an
appellate panel ... or a District Court," without comment.61
The Sixth Circuit focused on this element of the legislative history of sec-
tion 1293 to determine whether section 1291 could be used for bankruptcy
appeals.62 In In re Salem Mortgage Co., the court reasoned that because
(a) If the circuit council of a circuit orders application of this section to a district
within such circuit, the chief judge of each circuit shall designate panels of three
bankruptcy judges to hear appeals from judgments, orders, and decrees of the bank-
ruptcy court of the United States for such district.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 160, 92 Stat. 2659 (1978).
55. Id. § 1482, 2659, 92 Stat. 2549, 2671.
(a) Panels designated under section 160(a) of this title shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy courts.
(b) Panels designated under section 160(a) of this title shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from interlocutory judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy courts, but
only by leave of the panel to which the appeal is taken.
Id.
56. Id. § 1293(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2667.
57. Id.
58, Id. § 1293(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2667. "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of panels designated under section 160(a) of this title." Id.
59. Id. § 1293(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2667.
60. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
61. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); see 124 CONG. REC. 28,284 (1978). One com-
mentator stated that "[a]n excess of caution induced the Senate to add the additional language
to 1293(b)." Levin, Bankruptcy Appeals, 58 N.C.L. REV. 967, 968 n.5 (1980).
62. In re Salem Mortgage Co., 783 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (although Salem Mortgage
was decided after the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, the court
1991]
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section 1293 would have been the route of appeal from the district courts
under the earlier proposed version of the 1978 Act, "Congress certainly ap-
pears to have assumed that section 1291 would be available for bankruptcy
appeal[s] .... ",63 The court, however, failed to explain why Congress made
the change. Accordingly, its reasoning should be viewed with skepticism.
The legislative history regarding appeals under the 1978 Act is lacking,
and it is difficult to discern congressional intent in enacting section 1293.
Further, many of the problems regarding appellate jurisdiction under the
original 1978 Act continue under the 1984 version. As Mr. Levin summa-
rized in his article: "[t]he best one can conclude from these conflicting sig-
nals is that the appellate system was hastily constructed and drafted in the
final legislative days of the Ninety-Fifth Congress and that redrafting is
essential." 4
III. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS
UNDER THE 1984 AMENDMENTS
A. Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Judges
In the wake of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 6 Congress hastily adjusted the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in
an attempt to conform with the United States Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of Article III requirements.66 Section 1334 of Title 28 grants "original
and exclusive jurisdiction" to the district courts "of all cases under title
1 1.,67 Section 1334 further grants district courts "original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.,,69 Under 28 U.S.C. § 157, however,
"[b]ankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under title 11" that the district courts refer to
them.69 Pursuant to section 158, district courts or bankruptcy appellate
nevertheless looked at the legislative history of § 1293 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act,
now amended).
63. Id. at 632 n.15.
64. Levin, supra note 61, at 990.
65. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
66. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988).
68. Id. § 1334(b).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988). Section 157 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or
all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11
shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.
(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases arising under title 11
and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11,
[Vol. 40:265
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panels, where created, can review the orders and judgments that bankruptcy
judges enter in these cases and proceedings.7' In addition, section 158 per-
mits appeals of interlocutory orders of bankruptcy judges to the district
court, but only "with leave of court."'"
Bankruptcy proceedings are characterized as either "core" or "non-core"
proceedings.72 In core proceedings, the bankruptcy court judges may enter
referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and
judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 157(a)-(b)(l).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 158 states, in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals
from final judgments, orders, and decrees, and, with leave of the court, from interloc-
utory orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings re-
ferred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title. An appeal under this
subsection shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which
the bankruptcy judge is serving.
(b)(l) The judicial council of a circuit may establish a bankruptcy appellate panel,
comprised of bankruptcy judges from districts within the circuit, to hear and deter-
mine, upon the consent of all the parties, appeals under subsection (a) of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b)(1) (1988).
71. Id.
72. Congress provided guidance as to what constitutes a core proceeding in 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2), which states:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of c.aims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purposes of con-
firming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or esti-
mation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims
against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharge;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the
estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
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final judgments, subject only to timely appeals to the district courts. 73 In
non-core proceedings, however, bankruptcy judges need the parties' consent
in order to enter final judgments.74 Otherwise, bankruptcy judges may only
"submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district
court[s]," and the district courts enter final judgments upon consideration of
bankruptcy judges' opinions."
B. Jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals in Bankruptcy
Title 28, section 158(d) governs the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals in
bankruptcy matters. That section provides that "the courts of appeals shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and
decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this section."76 Section
158(d) resembles 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which governs the jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals in ordinary civil matters, in that both codify the traditional
final order rule.77
Despite the similar language, courts have consistently stated that "bank-
ruptcy proceedings justify a distinctive and more flexible definition of final-
ity."78 The relaxed standard is justified because "certain proceedings in a
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). "Non-core" proceedings include, for example, a breach of contract
action, In re World Solar Corp., 81 Bankr. 603 (S.D. Cal. 1988); an action by the government
for violation of environmental regulations, U.S. v. ILCO, Inc., 48 Bankr. 1016 (N.D. Ala.
1985); and a malpractice claim against an attorney, In re Environmental Research & Dev., 46
Bankr. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the district
court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, may refer a proceeding
related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to
enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this
title.
Id.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is
otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge
shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,
and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after consider-
ing the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de
novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.
Id.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d); see supra note 70 for the text of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b)(l).
77. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3906, at 425 (1976); see supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the final
order rule.
78. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3926, at 112 (1990 Supp.); see, e.g., In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 429
(9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting congressional intent to require "courts to conclusively and expedi-
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bankruptcy case are so distinct and conclusive either to the rights of individ-
ual parties or the ultimate outcome of the case that final decisions to them
should be appealable as of right."79 The only "true" final judgments in
bankruptcy matters are the closing of cases or proceedings, which render
moot many important decisions made in the process.8 0 Accordingly, the
courts have usually been more lenient in determining what is a final order in
bankruptcy for appellate purposes.8 1
C. The Relationship of Section 158(d) to Sections 1291 and 1292
As was the case under the 1978 Act,82 the courts have struggled, without
the benefit of legislative history, for an answer to whether 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
tiously adjudicate... complaints for relief from the automatic stay... [requiring] [i]mmediate
appeal from decisions of the bankruptcy appellate panel"). But see In re Magic Circle Energy
Corp., 889 F.2d 950, 953 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding "to the more traditional view of finality [to]
... further[] the policy underlying the finality doctrine by controlling piecemeal adjudication
and eliminating delays caused by interlocutory appeals").
79. In re Mason, 709 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1293, the
provision regulating appeals under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
80. Levin, supra note 61, at 983; see In re Apex Oil Co., 884 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1989),
where the court stated:
The factors used in deciding the finality of a bankruptcy order are the extent to
which (1) the order leaves the bankruptcy court nothing to do but execute the order;
(2) delay in obtaining review would prevent the aggrieved party from obtaining effec-
tive relief; and (3) a later reversal on that issue would require recommencement of
the entire proceeding.
Apex Oil, 884 F.2d at 347; see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 880 F.2d 1509, 1511 (2d Cir. 1989)
(stating that "discrete claims are often resolved at various times over the course of the
proceedings").
81. See, e.g., In re Spillane, 884 F.2d 642, 645 (1st Cir. 1989) (award of attorney's fees is
final where the attorney is no longer involved in case); Chateaugay Corp., 880 F.2d at 1512
(order denying relief from automatic stay is final because it is identical to permanent injunc-
tion); In re Moody, 817 F.2d 365, 366 (5th Cir. 1987) ("turnover order, in a separate adversary
proceeding, compelling a defendant to turn over property in his possession ... is [a] final
order"); In re Kaiser, 791 F.2d 73, 74 (7th Cir. 1986) (order by bankruptcy judge declaring
property to be included in bankrupt's estate is final as to persons claiming interest in the prop-
erty), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1011 (1986); In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 1985)
(order granting relief from automatic stay is final); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1041
(3d Cir. 1985) (district court's refusal to appoint representative for future asbestos claimants is
final); In re Matin Motor Oil, Inc., 689 F.2d 445, 448 (3d Cir. 1982) (district court's grant of
motion to intervene under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) is final). But see In re Watson, 884 F.2d 879,
880 (5th Cir. 1989) (order imposing sanctions on party is not final); In re Chateaugay Corp.,
826 F.2d 1177, 1179 (2d Cir. 1987) (order granting or denying withdrawals under § 157(d) is
not a final appealable order); In re Benny, 791 F.2d 712, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1986) (district court
order upholding constitutionality of 1984 bankruptcy amendments is not final); In re Delta
Services Ind., 782 F.2d 1267, 1269-72 (5th Cir. 1986) (order approving interim trustee is not
final).
82. See In re Adirondack Ry. Corp., 726 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing sections
1291 and 1292 in the bankruptcy appeal context); In re Regency Woods Apartments, Ltd., 686
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and 1292 are available for bankruptcy appeals under the 1984 amend-
ments.8 3 At one time, at least two circuits, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) to be comprehensive and exclusive.8 4 These
circuits stated that the courts of appeals could only exercise jurisdiction over
bankruptcy appeals by means of section 158(d)."5 The Fifth Circuit ex-
pressly held that neither section 1291 nor section 1292 were available in
bankruptcy cases.
8 6
In In re Teleport Oil Co.,87 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the appellant
could not use section 1292 to appeal the district court's refusal to stay the
appointment of a trustee. The court stated "[i]f § 1291 still applied to final
bankruptcy orders, § 158 would be superfluous. It is evident that Congress
intended § 158 to be the exclusive basis of jurisdiction in the appellate courts
in bankruptcy matters."88 Thus, the court held that parties could use
neither section 1291 nor section 1292 in bankruptcy appeals."9 While the
court indicated that the availability of a writ of mandamus and the relaxed
finality standard lessened the harshness of its holding, it nevertheless refused
to permit the appeal. 9°
The Fifth Circuit, in In re Barrier,91 specifically followed the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Teleport decision. In Barrier, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi denied a stay pending appeal of the bank-
ruptcy court's confirmation of the debtor's reorganization plan.92  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the district
court's denial of the stay was interlocutory and stated that 28 U.S.C. § 1292
did not apply.93 Nevertheless, the court granted a writ of mandamus order-
F.2d 899, 901 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (discussing section 1292). Both of these cases construe the 1978
Act.
83. No Senate or House report was submitted with this legislation and the House confer-
ence report contains no explanatory statement. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 882, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 576-78.
84. In re Barrier, 776 F.2d 1298, 1299 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Teleport Oil Co., 759 F.2d
1376, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1985).
85. Barrier, 776 F.2d at 1299; Teleport, 759 F.2d at 1377-78.
86. See In re First South Sav. Ass'n, 820 F.2d 700, 708 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he bank-
ruptcy appellate scheme in 28 U.S.C. § 158 clearly supersedes 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and, by infer-
ence, also supersedes section 1292.") (citing Barrier, 776 F.2d at 1299).
87. 759 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985).
88. Id. at 1378.
89. Id. While the court in Teleport did not specifically state so, it apparently felt that
because section 158 superseded section 1291, it inferentially superseded section 1292 as well.
See In re Adirondack Ry. Corp., 726 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Regency Woods Apart-
ments, 686 F.2d 899, 901 (11th Cir. 1982).
90. Teleport, 759 F.2d at 1378.
91. 776 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1985).
92. Id. at 1299.
93. Id.
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ing the district court to grant the stay because the court of appeals believed
there was "a serious potential for irreparable harm."9 4 More recent deci-
sions of these circuits, however, have limited the effects of Teleport and
Barrier. 95
The courts that have continued to rely on sections 1291 and 1292 for
bankruptcy appeals are at the other end of the spectrum. 96 The significance
of these decisions is that they permit the federal courts to use section 1292 to
permit appeals of interlocutory bankruptcy orders.97 The Seventh Circuit
reached this conclusion in In re Moens9 s because of the absence of contrary
evidence of congressional intent. The court stated:
While the section of the new bankruptcy code dealing with appeals
to the court of appeals does not specifically provide for such inter-
locutory appeals, there is nothing in the statute or in its legislative
history which indicates that Congress intended to foreclose such
review. Given the absence of any significant limitation in the lan-
guage of section 1292(b), we would expect the Congress to have
taken such action if in fact it intended such a limitation.99
The Moens court failed, however, to address the concerns of those courts
that found section 158(d) to be the exclusive means for appellate jurisdic-
tion.o" Similarly, courts that have adopted the approach of Moens have also
provided insufficient rationales for their decisions.10 1
94. Id. "This case is extraordinary because, as we have found, there is no other avenue of
appeal available to [the creditor], because there is a serious potential for irreparable harm in
the absence of a stay, and because the district court abused their discretion in denying relief."
Il
The Fifth Circuit also issued a writ of mandamus in In re First South Say. Ass'n, 820 F.2d
700 (5th Cir. 1987).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 113-18.
96. In re Goodman, 873 F. 2d 598, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Southern Indus. Banking
Corp., 872 F.2d 1257, 1259 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Rare Coin Galleries of America, Inc., 862
F.2d 896, 898 (1st Cir. 1988); In re Salem Mortgage Corp., 783 F.2d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 1986);
In re Moens, 800 F.2d 173, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1986).
97. See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989). In Sinclair, the court had
previously denied the appeal of the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's denial
of the debtor's request to convert from Chapter 11 to Chapter 12. In re Sinclair, 863 F.2d 885
(7th Cir. 1988). The Seventh Circuit accepted the second appeal, however, after the district
court certified the order for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1340 n.*.
98. 800 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1989).
99. Id at 177 (citation omitted).
100. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
101. In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d 727, 737 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Goodman, 873 F.2d 598,
601-02 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp., 872 F.2d 1257, 1259 (6th Cir.
1989); In re Rare Coin Galleries of America, Inc., 862 F.2d 896, 898 (1st Cir. 1988); In re
Salem Mortgage Corp., 783 F.2d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Benny, 791 F.2d 712, 718 (9th
Cir. 1986).
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D. Withdrawals of the Reference and Non-Core Proceedings
Additional problems arise when the district court withdraws the reference
to the bankruptcy court or when the court enters a judgment in a non-core
proceeding. Both of these issues have arisen out of the aftermath of Mara-
thon 102 and the resultant restricted bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334,103 "district courts exercise original ju-
risdiction in bankruptcy actions, but may automatically refer these matters
to bankruptcy courts."'" Section 157(d), however, provides for withdrawal
of this reference, thereby revesting jurisdiction of the case or proceeding in
the district court.05 Withdrawal of the reference is mandatory "if the court
determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both
title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activ-
ities affecting interstate commerce."'" In all other situations, withdrawals
of the reference are discretionary. ° 7 Once a district court grants a with-
drawal of the reference, it acts "as a court of original jurisdiction."
108
The situation is similar when district courts render judgments in non-core
proceedings." ° Unless the parties agree to renderings of final decisions by
the bankruptcy courts, the district courts will enter final judgments." 0
Any order that a district court enters after a withdrawal of the reference,
or in a non-core proceeding (absent the parties consent under section 157),
originates in the district court; by its express terms, section 158(d) is not
available for an appeal.' As the Third Circuit stated in an analogous
situation:
102. See Levin, supra note 61, at 990; supra text accompanying note 62.
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 1786
(1978).
104. In re Powelson, 878 F.2d 976, 979 (7th Cir. 1989).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) provides:
The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding re-
ferred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for
cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a
proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consid-
eration of both title I 1 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations
or activities affecting interstate commerce.
28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988).
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Powelson, 878 F.2d at 979.
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)-(c); supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c).
111. Capitol Credit Plan of Tenn., Inc. v. Shaffer, 912 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1990); Powel-
son 878 F.2d at 980.
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This result illustrates the gap existing in the procedure Congress
created to govern bankruptcy appeals. Section 158(a) grants the
district courts appellate authority over rulings entered by bank-
ruptcy judges. Additional review in the courts of appeals of the
district judges' appellate dispositions is then explicitly authorized
in section 158(d). However, no provision addresses the courts of
appeals' authority to review orders entered by the district courts in
their non-appellate bankruptcy role.'12
To circumvent this "gap" in the 1984 amendments, the courts have con-
sistently looked to section 1291 as a basis for appellate review.' 13 Even the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which at one point expressed the belief that section
158(d) was the only applicable provision for bankruptcy appeals," l4 now em-
brace this interpretation." 5
In In re Benny, 6 while not expressly overturning Teleport, 117 the Ninth
Circuit appeared to limit its application of the section 158(d) "exclusivity"
rule to cases in which district courts or bankruptcy appellate panels acted
pursuant to section 158(a) or (b). In Benny, the court held that parties could
use section 1291 for appeals in bankruptcy cases when the district court was
not reviewing decisions of bankruptcy judges. "8 The district court in Benny
had withdrawn the reference to a constitutional issue from the bankruptcy
judge and decided the issue on its own." 
9
112. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 1988). Nicolet did not in-
volve a withdrawal of the reference. There, the district court was acting as a court of original
jurisdiction. See also In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391, 1395 (5th Cir.
1987) ("When the district court sits in bankruptcy, section 158 does not apply.").
113. Powelson, 878 F.2d at 979-80.
114. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Benny, 791
F.2d 712, 718 (9th Cir. 1986).
116. 791 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1986).
117. See In re Teleport Oil Co., 759 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985); supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text.
118. Benny, 791 F.2d at 718.
[A]ppeals in bankruptcy cases may be taken to this court pursuant to section 158(d)
only if the order appealed from is within the scope of section 158(a), a bankruptcy
court order appealed to a district court....
The general provisions for the appeal of final orders of district courts, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, provides a possible alternative basis for jurisdiction over these two appeals.
A number of courts, including our own, have found this provision appropriate for
review of bankruptcy decisions not falling within the scope of section 158.
Id.
119. Id. at 715; see also In re Salem Mortgage Co., 783 F.2d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 1986)
(finding that section 1291 was available in bankruptcy "cases not referred to bankruptcy judges
under section 157.... Congress is unlikely to have sub silentio removed the right to appellate
review in these cases.").
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In the same fashion, the Fifth Circuit recently stated in In re Topco, Inc.
that "[b]oth Section 1291 and Section 158 govern appeals to courts of ap-
peals from district court decisions when district courts sit as bankruptcy ap-
pellate courts. Only Section 1291 governs appeals from district court
decisions when district courts sit as bankruptcy trial courts."12°
The Tenth Circuit, in Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Bokum Resources
Corp., 121 examining appeals of "non-core" matters, followed reasoning simi-
lar to that of the Fifth Circuit in Topco. The Teton court recognized that
"[s]ection 158(d) contains no provision for appellate review of final district
court orders entered in non-core proceedings under [section] 157(c)(1)" be-
cause the district court is not hearing an appeal from a final decision of the
bankruptcy court under section 158(a). 12 2 The court concluded that if sec-
tion 158(d) were the sole source of jurisdiction in bankruptcy appeals, then
the courts of appeals would not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from dis-
trict court decisions of non-core matters. 123 The court stated that it could
find "no indication that Congress intended [section] 158(d) to act as a limita-
tion on the general jurisdiction of appellate courts under [section] 129 1.
' 124
At first glance, this holding would appear insignificant because courts
have held that finality under section 1291 is measured by the same liberal-
ized standards used to examine orders entered in bankruptcy matters under
section 158(d).' 25 Once a circuit court finds section 1291 applicable, how-
ever, it follows that section 1292 is available for interlocutory appeals of
orders that originate in the district court. The majority of the circuits,
though, would only use section 1292 for interlocutory appeals of orders
originating in the district courts. 12 6 These circuits conclude that if section
1291, and therefore by analogy section 1292, applied to all bankruptcy ap-
peals, section 158(d) would be superfluous.127 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, based on its holding in Capitol Credit Plan of
120. In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d 727, 737 (5th Cir. 1990).
121. 818 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 1524 n.2.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985).
125. See United States v. Nicolet, 857 F.2d 202, 204 (3rd Cir. 1988); Tringali v. Hathaway
Mach. Co., 796 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1986); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir.
1984). But cf In re Hawaii Corp., 796 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1986) (liberalized rules of finality
for bankruptcy appeals do not apply to § 1291 appeals).
126. In re Lieb, 915 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Atencio, 913 F.2d 814, 816 (10th
Cir. 1990); Capitol Credit Plan of Tenn., Inc., 912 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Kaiser
Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380, 387 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Topco, 894 F.2d 727, 735 n.12 (5th Cir.
1990); In re Benny, 791 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1986).
127. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d at 386.
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Tennessee, Inc. v. American Financial Services Association, is apparently
the only court that has attempted to justify this result on other grounds.
That court held that judicial economy and "symmetry in the appellate sys-
tem" adequately support its conclusion that section 1292 should not be used
for orders that originate in the bankruptcy court.129
Using sections 1291 and 1292 to appeal orders originating in the bank-
ruptcy courts would, however, only render section 158(d) partially superflu-
ous. Without section 158(d), there would be no provision providing for
appeals from decisions of the bankruptcy appellate panels. The Fourth Cir-
cuit's reasoning is also questionable because legislative history does not indi-
cate that Congress intended such a result. 130 When district courts withdraw
the references, the issues that they decide are generally identical to those
upon which bankruptcy judges would have conclusively ruled. 131 If section
1292 applies in one instance, arguably it should apply in the other. Judicial
economy is also thwarted because the circuit courts continue to use the ex-
traordinary writ of mandamus to get around the problem.
1 32
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized that a problem does
exist, as its recent decision in Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Ben Cooper,
Inc. 133 indicates. While most courts consistently have held that orders with-
drawing the reference are not final appealable orders, 134 at least one circuit
128. 912 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1990).
129. Id at 753.
Allowing a second level of interlocutory review will further delay the proceedings,
and it may be used solely to harass the opposing party. In addition, the appellate
process is already quite costly to the parties... . Very little would be gained by
adding yet another layer of interlocutory review.
Indeed, this... produces symmetry in the appellate system for bankruptcy cases.
Whether the case begins in the bankruptcy court or the district court, the law would
provide for an interlocutory appeal in the next highest court, with appeals allowed to
go higher only after a final decision has been reached.
Id.
130. See supra text accompanying note 99.
131. See In re King Memorial Hosp., Inc., 767 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1985)
("[miotions to withdraw reference from the bankruptcy court under [§ ] 157(d) essentially
only determine the forum in which final decisions will be reached").
132. In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380, 388 (10th Cir. 1990) (mandamus granted for
review of the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's denial of a jury trial).
133. 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990). For the text of the opinion, see supra note 9.
134. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 826 F.2d 1177 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Moens, 800
F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Dalton, 733 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals compared a withdrawal to a venue transfer order, which "may not be ap-
pealed until final judgment." In re Kemble, 776 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1985). A withdrawal
of the reference has, however, been reviewed by way of writ of mandamus. See In re Powelson,
878 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1989); Kemble, 776 F.2d at 806 n.5.
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has held that federal courts may certify orders withdrawing the reference to
bankruptcy courts for interlocutory appeal under section 1292(b).' 35 The
Tenth Circuit reasoned that, because the orders withdrawing the references
originate in district courts, section 1292 should apply. 13 6
In an unprecedented decision, however, the Second Circuit recently re-
viewed a district court's withdrawal of the reference without ever establish-
ing its jurisdictional basis.' 37 While in the past the Second Circuit wavered
on whether section 1292 is available for bankruptcy appeals,"a8 its decision
in Ben Cooper referred neither to section 1292 nor to section 158(d) to estab-
lish its jurisdiction.' 39 The United States Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit so that it could resolve
the omitted jurisdictional question. " The Second Circuit, after establishing
its jurisdiction,' 4' recently returned Ben Cooper to the Supreme Court. As-
suming the Supreme Court agrees with the Second Circuit's reasoning, it can
address the important issue of jury trials in the bankruptcy court, an integral
part of the case. 1
42
135. Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d at 380; In re Dalton, 733 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1984).
136. Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d at 387. The court in Kaiser did, however, state that
section 1292 could not be utilized for orders originating in the bankruptcy court. Id. at 386.
137. In re Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990).
138. One panel of the Second Circuit used, without comment, section 1292 for an appeal of
the district court's refusal to dissolve an injunction of the bankruptcy court. In re Goodman,
873 F.2d 598, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1989). Another panel of the same circuit, however, recently
recognized the jurisdictional problem that exists, and indicated that section 1292 may not be
applicable when the order being appealed from originated in the bankruptcy court. In re Son-
nax Indus., Inc., 907 F.2d 1280, 1283 n.1 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Germain v. Connecticut
National Bank, 926 F.2d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[lIt would overly stretch section 1292 to
hold that an order entered by such an appellate panel [of bankruptcy judges] under section
158(b) might be subject to review as an interlocutory injunction under section 1292(a)(1) or
discretionary review after certification under section 1292(b).").
139. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1396. Interestingly, the three judges that heard Ben Cooper
were not involved in Goodman, 873 F.2d at 599, or Sonnax Indus., 907 F.2d at 1281. On the
same day as Ben Cooper, this panel also decided a similar case which allowed an appeal of the
district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's denial of a motion for transfer of venue.
In re Manville Forest Product's Corp., 896 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1990). Even though such
an order is clearly interlocutory, the court nevertheless allowed the appeal without comment.
140. 111 S. Ct, 425 (1990).
141. In the Ben Cooper remand, the Second Circuit implied that either section 158(d) or
section 1291 provided its jurisdiction. The court accomplished its result by merging the inter-
locutory withdrawal of the reference into the "final order" of the district court granting per-
missive abstention. In re Ben Cooper, 924 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1991). The petitioner,
Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, filed a petition for certiorari. The Court, however, recently
denied the Solicitor General's request for expedition of the hearing, which indicates the Court
is in no hurry to decide the merits. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Ben Cooper, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 1100 (1991).
142. Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Many courts have avoided these problems by permitting appeals under
sections 1291 and 1292 in all bankruptcy matters, from either the district
court or the bankruptcy court orders. 143 Congress acknowledged these mul-
tiple routes of appeal when it amended the statutes barring appeals in certain
bankruptcy abstentions and remands after removal.'" While Congress has
included sections 158(d), 1291, and 1292 in the list of forbidden routes when
appeal is barred, it has yet to indicate which of the three are appropriate
routes when appeal is permitted.
Simply interpreting sections 1291 and 1292 to apply to all bankruptcy
appeals, however, still forecloses the possibility of interlocutory appeals from
decisions of the bankruptcy appellate panels because these panels are ex-
cluded from the provisions of sections 1291 and 1292.145 This may explain
the Ninth Circuit's position on section 1292's applicability when the district
courts, or bankruptcy appellate panel, act in an appellate capacity, because
this is the only circuit in which such panels exist.'" The panels' appellate
capacity, however, equals that of district courts in reviewing decisions of the
bankruptcy judges and makes such a result difficult to justify. 147
143. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
144. Judical Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 309, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113.
Prior to this enactment, 11 U.S.C. § 305(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), and 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b),
contained the phrase "not reviewable by appeal or otherwise." Congress added the language
"by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291 or 1292 of this title or by the Supreme
Court of the United States under section 1254 of this title" to each of these statutes. See Pub.
L. No. 101-650, § 309, 104 Stat. at 5113.
145. L. PONOROFF & S. SNYDER, COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION $ 4.03, at 4-26
(1989).
146. One panel of the Ninth Circuit, however, recently found it had jurisdiction of an
appeal from a final order of a bankruptcy appellate panel under both sections 1291 and 158(d).
See In re Riverside-Linden Investment Co., 925 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1991).
147. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3926, at 116 (Supp. 1990), where the authors stated:
Even though appellate panels are composed of three bankruptcy judges, it is difficult
to be confident that access to the court of appeals should depend on whether the first
appellate review is had in the district court or an appellate panel. If appeal is avail-
able from district courts but not from appellate panels, moreover, parties may be less
willing to resort to appellate panels.
Id; see also Bermant & Sloan, supra note 53.
The January 1990 tentative report of the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Judicial
Conference recommends that each circuit establish bankruptcy appellate panels, and the Judi-
cial Improvements Act of 1990, signed by the President on December 1, 1990, and effective
upon enactment, provides that 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) be amended to allow the Judicial Council of
two or more circuits to establish intercircuit bankruptcy appellate panels. Pub. L. No. 10 1-650
§ 305, 104 Stat. at 5105. Therefore, the necessity of their inclusion in the statutes governing
bankruptcy appeals is of even greater import.
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The recent amendment to Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure indicates further judicial concern about bankruptcy appeals.
148
Although it neither addressed1 49 nor provided a solution to the problem
posed by this Article, subdivision (a) would appear to support the now uni-
versal conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is the applicable statute for appeals
when the district court is exercising original jurisdiction in bankruptcy
matters. 1
50
The Supreme Court has the power "to prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure . . . for cases in the United States district courts . .. and
courts of appeals,"'' and such rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right." '52 Congress increased significantly the Court's
power with a new sentence added to conclude section 2072(b): "All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect."' 53 Nevertheless, the Court does not attempt to use this
power to address interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy cases. The Court does
not mention interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy matters and thus does not
address or solve the problems previously outlined. 5' Two circuits have
ruled upon the use of section 1292 for bankruptcy appeals since the new
Rule 6 went into effect, and neither circuit mentioned the provisions of the
new rule as having any bearing on its decision.'
1 5
IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY REVISIONS
While the problem may seem complex, the solution is rather simple. As
previously stated, there is no apparent reason why interlocutory orders to
the courts of appeals should only be permitted when the district court is
148. FED. R. App. P. 6 advisory committee's note.
149. The advisory committee's note states that "[tihis subdivision is included to avoid un-
certainty arising from the question of whether a bankruptcy case is a civil case .... Subdivi-
sion (a) makes it clear that [the Rules of Appellate Procedure] apply to an appeal from a
district court bankruptcy decision." FED. R. App. P. 6 advisory committee's note.
150. FED. R. App. P. 6 (a) provides, "An appeal to a court of appeals from a final judg-
ment, order or decree of a district court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334
shall be taken in identical fashion as appeals from other judgments, orders or decrees of district
courts in civil actions." FED. R. App. P. 6(a).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988).
152. Id. § 2072(b).
153. Id. This sentence is the famous supersession clause which Representative Kas-
tenmeier saw as an unconstitutional "trump" of existing statutes. See 134 CONG. REC.
H10,440 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988).
154. Rule 6(b) makes most of the other Rules of Appellate Procedure applicable to appeals
from a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). See FED.
R. App. P. 6(b).
155. Capitol Credit Plan of Tenn., Inc. v. Shaffer, 912 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1990); In re
Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990).
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sitting in original jurisdiction.15 6 In addition, interlocutory appeals are per-
mitted from the bankruptcy courts to the district courts (or bankruptcy ap-
pellate panels),157 therefore, arguably, they should be permitted in the courts
of appeals. Interpreting the present construction merely to permit the use of
section 1292 is insufficient because that section's provisions do not account
for the presence of the bankruptcy appellate panels." 8 As the Fourth Cir-
cuit recently stated, "[a] simple clarifying amendment could resolve the split
among the circuits."' 5 9 The solution proposed is the amendment of 28
U.S.C. § 158(d) to state that: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
in bankruptcy cases and proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
1292." Congress could then amend sections 1291 and 1292 to account for
appeals from the bankruptcy appellate panels."6
V. CONCLUSION
The current scheme of bankruptcy appeals has caused the circuit courts
great difficulty. The confusion is best illustrated by the fact that some courts
resort to using the writ of mandamus and other jurisdictional statutes to
resolve the problem. As this Article suggests, Congress should correct the
defect in the jurisdictional scheme by amending section 158(d) to include
jurisdiction under sections 1291 and 1292, and amending sections 1291 and
1292 to permit appeals from the bankruptcy appellate panels. The change
156. See Capitol Credit, 912 F.2d at 753; supra text accompanying note 131.
157. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b).
158. See Capitol Credit, 912 F.2d at 753; supra text following note 129.
159. Capitol Credit, 912 F.2d at 754.
160. The statutes would read, for example, with inserted new language italicized:
§ 1291. Final decisions of district courts and bankruptcy appellate panels
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States, the bankruptcy appellate panels ....
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
§ 1292. Interlocutory decision
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the
bankruptcy appellate panels ....
(b) When a district judge, or a bankruptcy appellate panel, in making in a
civil action an order not otherwise appealable under the section, shall be of
the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an im-
mediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termi-
nation of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988). For additional statutory text, see supra notes 10 and 15.
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proposed in this Article would eliminate the waste of judicial time and re-
sources in the critical area of bankruptcy.
